Globalization and Integration by Noerper, Stephen
9
 Number 7, 2000The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
GLOBALIZATION AND INTEGRATION
Dr. Prof. Stephen Noerper
The autumn winds blow toward
me as I journey to a far-off land.
D.Natsagdorj
Through the course of our discussions at the School of Foreign Service,
we have journeyed to distant lands and understand better the new terrains of
this increasingly globalize and integrated world. Dr. Robert Scalapino, distin-
guished Professor Emeritus at the University of California Berkeley, visiting
Ulaanbaatar in September 2000 noted that, “we are witnessing the simultaneous
rise of three forces that are innately competitive, “namely internationalism, na-
tionalism, and communalism. The movement of these forces challenges the tra-
ditional notions of the nation-state, altering our notions of sovereignty and
intervention. There exists the question of the influence of the state in change,
the question of decline, the question of alterations in territory, population, and
government as the center of authority. We witness ethnicities overlapping bor-
ders, as in the case with the Uighur minority in Northwest China, and changing
relational identity.”
In An Agenda for Peace, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali suggested that ‘the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has passed.
It is the task of leaders of State today to understand this and to find a balance
between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever
more interdependent world”. It is our task to expand upon and consider further
this phenomenon and place them in the larger context of security and globaliza-
tion. We need focus the dynamics and challenges of globalization, and in our
discussion of political transitions and generational change discuss the dynam-
ics and challenges associated with pluralism and governance.
One aspect of globalization is that of culture, of art, of music. The singer
and songwriter Paul Simon authored a commentary on the great American com-
poser, George Gershwin, in the September 6, 1998 New York Times. (“Highbrows
and Hits: A Fertile Compound,”2:28). Simon talked about the mix of musical
cultures in this manner:
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“In truth, cultures and artistic movements influence each other by osmo-
sis, the proximity of different cultures, magnified by the speed of technology,
offers an irresistible challenge to artists to rearrange and reinvent languages,
musically, visually, and verbally. Cross cultural dialogue is inevitable as genera-
tions, philosophies, and artistic movements bang against each other, intermingle,
intermarry, and interface.”
Economic Integration
In an international context, interdependence is that mesh-in both security
and economic terms. The evidence on the economic front is myriad:
Almost 70 percent of Asia-Pacific economic trade is now with other Asia
Pacific countries. This figure compares to intra-regional trade of 64 percent only
10 years ago. It is as high as transatlantic trade, where the countries are a) closer
geographically, b) more similar politically, and c) where intra-European trade has
been fostered by the European Union trade area.
Cross-border investment flows also have grown dramatically in the Asia-
Pacific region and have become another major facet of increased Asia-Pacific
interdependence. China hosts major investment flows from Hong Kong, Tai-
wan, and South Korea, while Japanese investments in Southeast Asia have
laced those economies more closely to Japan’s economy.
Jim Rohwer, author of Asia Rising, noted the tremendous integration of
economies through investment and trade linkages. In considering changing
trade value patterns, he notes a dramatic increase from only 1985 to 1992 in all
directions.
We also see numerous joint ventures between companies of various coun-
tries in the Asia-Pacific region-the United States and Japan; South Korea and
China; Taiwan and Malaysia; the United States and China, for example-have
dramatically increased the interdependent sharing of capital, technology, and
expertise within the region. With the current bailout, we will see a surge in joint
ventures.
And it is that interdependent sharing, I would suggest, that impacted the
course of the Asia financial crisis, both negatively and perhaps in the end,
positively. On one hand, the severity was felt throughout the region and we
encountered a post-Cold War “domino effect,” because of the porous nature of
capital investment across Asia. On the other hand, it was that very interdepen-
dence that led to solutions, in that suddenly it is in everyone’s vested interest to
see effective restructuring and resolution of other nation’s economic woes.
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Integration begets interdependence. In turn, interdependence speaks to
cooperation, common interests, and common needs. It speaks to the notion of
greater connectedness.
Interdependence also may be approached in terms of divergence, or sym-
metry, the notion of symmetric versus asymmetric relationships. How equal are
actors or nations?
Imbalance implies asymmetry-for example, a trade imbalance. Disparities in
military capabilities, differing sizes of economies, different market sizes imply
asymmetry.
These terms speak as well to the two traditional international relations
schools of thought, namely realism and liberalism:
Subscribers of realism recognize a referent of the state, of liberalism the
population, or citizens. The realist objective is power and survival, the liberal
plenty and economic welfare. In terms of world view, subscribers of realism
envision anarchy and a globe regulated by balance of power politics, while
subscribers of liberalism recognize the importance of international institutions
and efforts at cooperation. Realists are concerned with national security, liberal’s
international security. Now most importantly for this lesson, subscribers of real-
ism argue only relative gains associated with economic exchange and a win-lose
situation. Proponents of liberalism see absolute gains, a win-win dimension. In
terms of interdependence, subscribers of realism see interdependence as de-
pendence, suggesting a vulnerability that can lead to conflict or war. Propo-
nents of liberalism see an efficiency associated with specialization and prosper-
ity leading to international peace. The cost of war is simply too great relative to
economic benefits, suggesting that in the final cost-benefit analysis, coopera-
tion wins out over conflict.
In sum, then how we view interdependence, economic or otherwise, de-
pends on your worldview, how you perceive prospects for conflict or coopera-
tion. The New York Time’s Thomas Friedman has posited an alternative model,
encouraging us to identify ourselves along the lines of separatists versus inte-
grationists, let-them-eat-cankers versus social-safety-netters.
Beverly Crawford (“Hawks, Doves, but No Owls: International Economic
Interdependence and Construction of the New Security Dilemma” in Columbia
University’s On Security), couched this division by way of economic doves and
hawks. Are you an economic dove, subscribing to the belief that interdepen-
dence reduces military threats, or a hawk, suggesting increased military vulner-
abilities? Do you subscribe to the notion suggested by Robert Keohane and
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Joseph Nye in “Interdependence in World Politics,” part of the now classic text
Power and Interdependence, that economic interdependence can minimize threats
directly by reducing incentives to use force in settling disputes?
Crawford similarly suggests that interdependence reduces threats because
it weakens incentives for military conquest; but at the same time, interdepen-
dence increases vulnerability and threatens to weaken the state, because poten-
tial military resources, particularly high-technology ones, may increasingly be
found in global commercial markets. She suggests that increasing globalization
of production and exchange presents an economic security dilemma.
Permit me to demonstrate such a dilemma, and here I use an example from
Italy, as described in a visual arts review from the September 14, 1997 edition of
the Sunday Seattle Times. In a mixed media exhibition titled “Le Tonnare” con-
temporary artist Donald Feels afforded something of an economic interdepen-
dence primer, shedding light on the Mediterranean blue fin tuna industry. In the
words of reviewer Robin Updike, the work depicts “how modern air freight and
the Japanese sashimi market have changed the ancient Mediterranean fishing
industry forever.” She explains that ‘for his current project Feels traveled to a
small island off the west coast of Sicily. For thousands of years the Sicilians
fished for blue fin tuna, building elaborate net-and-trap systems to catch the
fish, which are some of the strongest and fastest swimmers in the sea. By the late
19th century, enterprising Sicilians were also building canning plants so the fish
could be captured and immediately canned. Capturing and canning the fish
became the main industries in many of these islands. Now however, the Sicilian
blue fin industry is virtually gone. Blue fin meat is among the most highly prized
in Tokyo’s fresh fish markets, and Japanese industrial trawlers now catch many
of the fish before they enter Sicilian waters. Efficient air freight means that the
fish can be flown fresh from the trawlers to Japanese markets, where a whole fish
goes for $10,000 to $15,000.”
The work “Global Tuna” was reproduced atop the review and featured a
montage of a large blue fins, relief’s of Sicily and Japan, hands engaged in the
buy and sell, a crate and airplane, and portions of sashimi. Noted the artist, “here
is a situation involving two ancient cultures, the Sicilians and the Japanese, and
neither one is to blame. There is no blame. It’s economics. You simply don’t can
ignore something that’s worth $10,000 to $15,000.” He added, “I feel strongly
that the world is way more complicated than most of us bother to notice.”
But here we have depicted modern transportation and, implied in the buy
and sell, the use of modern communication-which speak to something called
globalization.
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Defining Globalization
A variety of definitions abound. Sigmund Bauman, professor emeritus at
the University of Leeds and University of Warsaw, notes in his 1998 Columbia
University text Globalization: the Human Consequences: “Globalization is on
everybody’s lips; a fad word fast turning into a shibboleth, a magic incanta-
tion.”
Clearly, we have seen a progression of terms and ideas in the debate over
globalization. One sees globalization described as a phenomenon, a trend, a
process, and perhaps most important of late, the international system that re-
placed the Cold War system, a thesis advanced by Friedman in The Lexus and
the Olive Tree (1999).
One of the few criticisms levied about his work is that it is somewhat
anecdotal. But anecdotes often are compelling, so let us move to one:
One example drawn from Wednesday’s (May 26, 1999) BBC News is that
Manchester United-battling Bayern Munich in the European Champions League
final-enjoys the unqualified support of many Malaysians. Some 5000 fans be-
long to the KL branch of the Man United supporters club and have found a
haven in the cyber cafe. Says the report, thousands of miles from Old Trafford,
all they have to do is type in a search for Manchester United and log into their
favorite team’s home page. Fan’s here say the Internet has become their main
source of information, because local newspapers do not carry enough sports
news for their taste.”
Here we have a cultural melding, suggesting an “increasingly universal
culture” and which you may weigh relative to our discussions of identity and
trip to the Great Artistic Heritage of Mongolia exhibition.
In an economic sense, globalization means that the factors of production
have become increasingly mobile. Capital moves freely across national bound-
aries. Corporations can easily move their bases of operation to lower cost pro-
duction areas; technology and information diffuse almost instantly across na-
tional boundaries; raw materials are rapidly transported from their source to
processing and production sites thousands of miles away (again the case of the
bluefish tuna).
Globalization: New or Old?
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye noted in an issue of Foreign Affairs
(“Power     and     Interdependence     in     the     Information     Age, September/
October 1998, Vol., 77 No.5) that “interdependence among societies in not new.
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What is new is the virtual erasing of costs of communicating over distance as a
result of the information revolution.”
New York Times Tokyo Bureau Chief Nicholas Kristof in a Sunday edition
September 20, 1999 (“As Free-flowing Capital Sinks Nations, Experts Prepare to
Rethink System,” 1:6) similarly notes that globalization “may not be quite as
fresh as it sometimes seems.” He opens his piece with the following tale:
“They were the world’s richest and shrewdest investors, and they rode a
wave of globalization to buy bonds in a promising developing country. When
the country defaulted, they were livid. “There should be lunatic asylums for
nations as well as individuals, ‘one investor wrote in The Morning Post of
London, denouncing the defaulting country as ‘a nation with whom no con-
tracts can be made.’ It all sounds a bit familiar, but the year was 1842 and the
developing country was the United States. After defaults by Maryland, Penn-
sylvania, Mississippi, and Louisiana, the entire United States was blacklisted
and scorned on global markets.” Kristof also noted that “since at least the 13th
century when Florentine merchants lent to the English to pay for King Edward
its wars, international capital has roamed the world in search of high returns.”
What is different is the “scale of capital flows and their abilities to capsize small
nations-or even large ones.”
The New York Time’s Kristof (May 23, 1999, Wk 5, “At This Rate, We’ll be
Global in Another Hundred years”) notes Chinese demand for silver in the 16th
through 18th centuries, which bolstered a Spanish empire’s finances and sla-
very as Spanish mining magnates in the Americas traded silver for slave. Down
the line, that silver was used in part to purchase Chinese porcelain and silk. A
century ago, England and France invested heavily in developing countries.
Northwestern University economist Alan Taylor suggests that “to me as an
economic historian, it was really the 19th century that represented the birth of
the global economy.” Yet in the 19th century, trade was mostly in commodities,
not manufactured goods, as is now the case. Moreover, today capital move-
ments, investments, are more broadly based (then it was prosperous families;
Baron von Rothschild said in 1875 “the world is a city”), flighty, and speculative.
Kristof notes that “capital rushes around the world...technology has created an
electronic herd (a term of Friedman’s) but as yet no electronic cowboys to con-
trol the herd.”
So again, the key here appears to be mobility, mobility of vast capital
resources and mobility based on low cost and ease of information access asso-
ciated with the information revolution. Keohane and Nye observe that “now
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anyone with a computer can be a desktop publisher, and anyone with a modem
can communicate with distant parts of the world at a trivial cost. Earlier
transnational flows were heavily controlled by large bureaucracies...such orga-
nizations remain important, but the dramatic cheapening of information trans-
mission has opened the field to loosely structured network organizations and
even individuals. These NGOs and networks are particularly effective in pen-
etrating states without regard to borders and using domestic constituencies to
force political leaders to focus on their preferred agendas.”
They go on to note that the “quantity of information available in cyberspace
means little by itself; the quality of information and distinctions between types
of information are probably more important.” As a result of the latter, they sug-
gest a politics of credibility; credibility of information is the “crucial resource
and asymmetrical credibility is a key source of power.” They note “unlike
asymmetrical interdependence in trade, where power goes to those who can
afford to hold back or break trade ties, information power flows to those who can
edit and credibly validate information.”
Globalization: Good or Bad?
Now the effect of the information and capital flows associated with global-
ization have been deemed by many as “overwhelmingly good.” Overseas De-
velopment Council and Goldman Sachs International Chair Peter Sutherland
noted in February {Time Special Report) the “stunning increase in international
investment that is building roads, airports, and factories in poorer countries. In
the 1990s alone, foreign investors have poured $1 trillion into developing econo-
mies. This trade and investment is raising living standards in some countries
faster than many thought possible. Until recently, it took two generations for
living standards to double, but in China, living standards now double every ten
years.”
However, he acknowledges though that while globalization has raised
living standards for many, it has made life more difficult for those dislocated by
change and “threatens to leave part of the world behind.”
Zygmunt Bauman, of Leeds and Warsaw, suggests that “Being local in a
globalize world is a sign of social deprivation and degradation.” Simply, said the
have knots have less. He notes that an “integral part of the globalizing pro-
cesses is progressive spatial segregation, separation, and exclusion. Neo-tribal
and fundamentalist tendencies, which reflect and articulate the experience of
people on the receiving end of globalization, are as much legitimate offspring of
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globalization as the widely acclaimed ‘hybridization’ of top culture. A particular
cause for worry is the progressive breakdown in communication between the
increasingly global and extraterritorial elites and the ever more ‘localized’ rest.”
Some of you are aware of campaigns to provide computer access to schools
and individuals less fortunate. Some NGOs are pushing at the international level
for such assistance to developing countries. To move from music and art to
astronomy, I was struck by a New Yorker (August 10, 1998) article, titled “An-
nals of Astronomy: Seeing in the Dark,” by Timothy Ferris, who noted that
“Earth is by intergalactic standards a local object and indeed belongs to the
cluster of galaxies that includes our own galaxy, the Milky Way, and is called by
astronomers the Local Group.” Ferris described amateur astronomer John
Dobson’s contention to a group of amateur telescope-makers that “to me it’s not
so much how big your telescope is, or how accurately your optics are figured, or
how beautiful the pictures you can take with it—it’s how many people in this
vast world less privileged than you have had a chance through your telescope
to see and understand this universe.” This appears an apt analogy to the need
for access among those “globalize” in isolation.
Responses
Given these challenges and disparities, then, what are the practical re-
sponses that you as students of international affairs and future policymakers
and /or businesspeople can employ? Friedman describes an emerging global
order that “demands an enforcer. That’s America’s new burden.” That conten-
tion has stirred a variety of responses.
One example is the US State Department’s attempt to adjust to these chang-
ing times. US Deputy Secretary of State Talbot’s description warrants careful
consideration, particularly his focus on new policies and new partners, are they
inter-governmental or “multi-multilateral.” He suggests a leveraging of scarce
resources and improvement of the ability to address transnational threats-a
major focus of our next block-”by forming coalitions with non-state actors-
multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and international
institutions.
(I also like his suggestion that the “very word ‘foreign’ is becoming obso-
lete... what happens there matters here and vice versa. That is not only a fact of
life and useful shorthand definition of globalization itself, it is also a key selling
point for those of us... who are trying to make foreign policy less foreign and
more relevant.”)
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To quote Pacific Forum CSIS Executive Director Ralph Cossa in a National
Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) study, Asia-Pacific multilateralism is “clearly a
growth industry today,” both at the official, or track I, and non-governmental, or
track II, levels.
Foremost among the track I initiatives mentioned in our sub-regional over-
views is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which emerged “to foster the habit
of constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of
common interest and concern,” according to the 1994 Chairman’s statement. Of
interest to our discussion of the security manifestation of economic interdepen-
dence is the ARF’s willingness to look beyond its ASEAN membership toward
broader Asian concerns. For example, the ASIAN foreign minister’s unanimously
endorsed early resumption of the inter-Korean talks and have endorsed South
Korea’s call for a sub-regional forum to address Northeast Asian security con-
cerns.
In speaking of Korea, I note another organization that rides the economic
and security nexus, namely the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organi-
zation, KEDO, which former KEDO Executive Director and current US Ambassa-
dor to South Korea Stephen Bosworth described as an “important feature on the
political landscape in Northeast Asia.” Ambassador Bosworth has noted that
KEDO might well typify the sort of multilateral cooperation effort we’re likely to
see in the post-Cold War era: economically-driven but with security underpin-
nings, especially in terms of building confidence, ad hoc, mission-oriented, tem-
porary, and therefore cost-effective.
In the same vain, I would point out the East-West Center NE Asia Eco-
nomic Forum support for the formation of a Northeast Asia Development Bank,
designed to enhance cooperation and foster development, be it in assisting a
divided Korean Peninsula to unify or Mongolia or the Russian Far East to de-
velop further.
In this context, as well, we see a thrust toward preventive diplomacy. The
Second ASEAN Regional Forum Chairman’s statement more narrowly defines
the term as diplomatic efforts which extend beyond confidence building mea-
sures, but which stop short of measures to resolve conflict. Such initiatives may
include “intermediate” actions aimed at situations where mutual confidence
building efforts have deteriorated, but where military conflict has not yet en-
sued.
In the United Nations, member states attach increased importance to pre-
ventive diplomacy as the most cost-effective ways of dispute prevention and
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control. The UN experience in recent years has demonstrated several comple-
mentary forms of preventive activity: preventive deployment, preventive disar-
mament, preventive humanitarian action, and preventive peace-building, the
latter of which may involve action aimed at good governance, human rights, and
economic and social development. According to the UN Department of Political
Affairs, it is for this reason that the Secretary-General in 1996 re-labeled “pre-
ventive diplomacy” “preventive action.”
Another aspect of preventive diplomacy that grows out of our thinking
about interdependence and globalization concerns the range of appropriate
action specific to regional, international, or non-governmental organizations. In
her chapter “Regional and Sub-regional Organizations in International Conflict
Management,” in Chester Crocker et al.’s Managing Global Chaos: Source of
and Response to International Conflict, Ruth Wedgwood observes that “in the
last five years, there has been a salient pattern of double-teaming among inter-
national organizations; major powers with security interests and the UN Secu-
rity Council have worked effectively with ad hoc regional groupings, formal
regional organizations, and specific sub-regional groups to adapt their charters
for new uses.” Scott Snyder of the Asia Foundation Korea has suggested that
“given the effectiveness of coordinated responses among international and
regional organizations, the opportunity to effectively harmonize regional and
international efforts at preventive diplomacy should not be missed.” This double-
teaming, > coordination, harmonization are part of what Talbot termed effective
“multi-multilateralism.”
Lastly, I would like to focus briefly on the US defense establishment’s
attempt to address globalization and security through, the notion of “preven-
tive defense.” In a 1996 Foreign Affairs article, then-US Secretary of Defense
William Perry suggested that “today the United States has a unique historical
opportunity to foster peace through preventive defense.” He goes on to cite
two similar opportunities earlier this century, namely one missed in the form of
an isolationist America’s rejection of the League of Nations and one seized upon
in a post-World War II “ path of engagement” that entailed the Marshall Plan,
what he labels the “epitome of preventive defense.” In noting that preventive
defense serves “to build openness and trust between nations.” Secretary Perry
cited the Marshall Center. In Germany and Asia-Pacific Center in Hawaii as prime
examples. In I a May 1996 Foreign Policy Backgrounder on his remarks to the
29th International General Meeting of the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC),
then-Secretary Perry outlined as a “pillar” of preventive defense the “promotion
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of multilateral security initiatives designed to reduce tension and build regional
confidence.”
Let me conclude, as we began, with a quote from the world of music that
speaks to us by way of security and strategy:
In a feature on resurgent interest in Brazilian Tropically, a style popular-
ized in the late 1960s and 1970s by musician Tom Ze and others, New York Times
Magazine editorial director Gerald Marzorati (“Tropicalia, Agora,” April 25, 1999,
pp.50-1) suggests— as we might of globalization and integration—that:
“It represents something more, a recognition that ‘center’ and “periphery’
are becoming more proximate and less clearly delineated, that borders are grow-
ing more porous back and forth... going omni directionally global... it may well be
that global-scale mixing-sampling-layering is the only...strategy that suits a quick-
ened world of clicks and info-fragments, jumbo jet migrations, and hyphenated
identities.”
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